The protection of migratory animals requires cooperation among multiple decision-making entities. These may include individual resource users or property owners, different government agencies within a single national or state jurisdiction, or the governments of different sovereign nations. The fate of the migratory animals, the values accruing to the various human actors, and the costs they bear, will depend on a suite of actions taken by several independent entities at different points in space and time. No single decision maker has full control over the set of human actions that will determine the overall status of the migratory species--or even the outcomes valued by that single decision maker. Recognizing this interdependence, human decision makers will tend to behave strategically. In other words, their decisions regarding the best way to achieve their individually-valued objectives will depend on the expected actions and reactions of the other relevant actors. This interplay can take a variety of forms--ranging from individual decisions on compliance, or not, with hunting regulations as a function of the likelihood of getting caught and the severity of the resulting punishment, to the strategic positions of individual nations in negotiating treaties on habitat conservation or fishery management. The policy problem thus entails designing an appropriate set of incentives for each of the decision-making entities to channel their actions towards mutually satisfactory and environmentally-responsible outcomes. A changing climate can complicate this task by altering the migratory behavior or reproductive success of the animals that a policy or agreement is attempting to manage. This Article will survey a range of policy situations in which the efficacy of a policy, treaty or other agreement could be undermined by strategic behavior--in particular strategic reactions to the effects of changing environmental conditions.
